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ABSTRACT

Popular opinion and many historians portray the effects of Soviet espionage on the
United States as disastrous. Although covert Soviet efforts undeniably harmed America,
their extent and gravity has been greatly exaggerated. This paper evaluates primary
and secondary sources on the subject to strike a delicate balance between minimizing
and inflating the effects of Soviet activities. It acknowledges that espionage did some
damage, but questions the legal status, extent, and effect of much of the Soviets’ “stolen”
information, ultimately arguing that most Soviet espionage was actually more harmful to
the Soviet Union than to the United States.

RUSSIAN COLONEL IS INDICTED
HERE AS TOP SPY IN U.S.1
CHIEF ‘RUSSIAN SPY’
NAMED BY M’CARTHY:
Senator Says He Has Link With State Department—
Tydings Speeds Hearing on Charge2
ATOM AIDE IN WAR
CALLED SOVIET SPY:
Hickenlooper Says Photograph Shows
Bomb Project Official With Russian Agents3
Telegrams Show Genius In Soviet’s Spy Setup4
These headlines from national newspapers in the
1940s and 1950s epitomize the popular perception
that Soviet espionage was everywhere in the United
States and that such espionage was continually exacting
disastrous consequences on the nation. Although many
historians argue to this day that the results of Soviet
spying changed American history for the worse, it was
not nearly as devastating as popular portrayals would
have the nation believe.
The following pages argue in support of this assertion,
based on a delicate balance between belittling and
exaggerating the effects of Soviet activities. Although
Soviet espionage did result in some damage, most
espionage was actually more harmful to the Soviet
Union than the United States. The most dangerous
spies were actually Americans, not Soviets, and United
States counterintelligence substantially reduced the
harm done by the Soviet Union.5
1 Mildred Murphy, “Russian Colonel is Indicted Here as
Top Spy in U.S.,” New York Times, August 8, 1957, accessed
November 7, 2015, from http://search.proquest.com/
docview/114187738?accountid=11667. This news article
described the arrest of illegal Soviet agent Rudolf Ivanovich Abel.
2 William S. White, “Chief ‘Russian Spy’ Named by
M’Carthy,” New York Times, March 22, 1950, accessed
November 7, 2015, from http://search.proquest.com/
docview/111481689?accountid=11667. The article reports on
McCarthy’s attempt to reveal information based on some vague
disclosures by his personal friend, J. Edgar Hoover, hence the
inconclusive nature of McCarthy’s accusations and Hoover’s
refusal to cooperate by disclosing VENONA files.
3 “Atom Aide in War Called Soviet Spy,” New York Times,
July 1, 1951, accessed November 7, 2015, from http://search.
proquest.com/docview/112214568?accountid=11667
4 Igor Gouzenko, “Telegrams Show Genius in Soviet’s
Spy Setup,” Washington Post, August 9, 1948, accessed
November 7, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/
152034537?accountid=11667. This is a report by the Soviet
defector Gouzenko on part of the Soviet’s elaborate spy system.
5 My sources are necessarily secondary in most cases, insofar
as I have no security clearance to view classified FBI, CIA, and

Any argument downplaying covert Soviet endeavors
must begin with an admission that some espionage
unquestionably led to detrimental consequences for
the United States. Navy Chief Warrant Officer and
communications specialist John Walker betrayed
nuclear submarine secrets, information about the
United States Navy, and plans during the Vietnam
War, which led to countless unnecessary deaths.6 In
the words of former CIA National Clandestine Service
director Michael Sulick,
John Walker’s compromising of US naval
capabilities cost the government millions of
dollars to develop countermeasures. . . . Moreover,
the damage caused by espionage cannot be
calculated only in dollars. When Walker spied
for the KGB, he had access to information about
US bombing raids against North Vietnam. He
passed that information to the Soviets, who in
turn passed it to their North Vietnamese allies.
In various towns and cities across the United
States, a father lost a child, a son lost a father, or
a sister lost a brother who was a pilot shot down
over Vietnam because of a spy’s betrayal.7

KGB files. But I have located authors who either were former
KGB, FBI, or CIA agents, or authors granted special permission
to access the archives of these agencies. An excellent overview of
the consequences of Soviet espionage is found in Jerrold Schecter
and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence
Operations Changed American History, (Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s, Inc., 2002). A comprehensive analysis of Soviet espionage
from the viewpoint of a former CIA agent can be found in the two
books by Michael Sulick: Spying in America: Espionage from the
Revolutionary War to the Dawn of the Cold War (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), and American Spies:
Espionage against the United States from the Cold War to the
Present, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
One of the best sources from a KGB defector is Christopher
Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The
Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New
York: Basic Books, 1999). One of the authoritative sources on the
important Venona documents is John Earl Haynes and Harvey
Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), and a good source on
the briefly opened KGB archives is John Earl Haynes, Harvey
Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the
KGB in America, with translations by Philip Redko and Steven
Shabad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). A final
note concerning my sources: since the nature of my argument
is comprehensive (the overall effect of Soviet espionage), I have
lightly touched upon dozens of instances and persons rather than
delving deeply into any specific instance. For further research into
each case, see the bibliographies of the sources listed in this paper.
6 Sulick, Spying in America, 240.
7 Sulick, American Spies, 14.
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Due to the treachery of Donald Maclean and Guy
Burgess, two British officials in Washington D.C. who
were working for the Soviets, the Soviets “had full
access to American strategic planning and operational
orders for the Korean War. . . . Maclean and Burgess
forwarded the date for MacArthur’s offensive north of
the 38th parallel, November 26, 1950, to the Kremlin.”8

reform and several other Allied actions with the Berlin
Blockade of 1948-1949.10

Despite the gravity of these instances, the Soviet Union
acquired most of its potentially harmful information
legally. If the war had broken out between the two
nations, the intelligence gathered would definitely have
set the United States at more of a disadvantage than if
Because of such advance notice transferred from no such spying had occurred. But according to former
Moscow to the Chinese, Mao Zedong was able to spring head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar
a trap on MacArthur, costing many lives and a strategic Hoover,
setback. Some time later, the same two agents informed
Moscow of President Truman and the United Nation’s
Many phases of Soviet intelligence gathering .
intention not to use the atomic bomb in the war—
. . do not involve violations of [US] laws. The
9
information that greatly emboldened the Communists.
Soviets exploit fully the democratic freedoms
of this country and gather legally much data in
In addition to the above instances of true injury to the
the public realm. One defector has estimated
United States military, John Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and
that the Soviet Military Attaché’s office in the
Alexander Vassiliev in Spies: The Rise and Fall of the
United States is able to obtain legally 95% of the
KGB in America list countless other American traitors
material useful for its intelligence objectives.11
in the government, military forces, and elsewhere who
have now been definitively proven Soviet spies by KGB In other words, the damage done exclusively by illegal
archives, the decoded VENONA messages, and the espionage was not nearly as devastating as popularly
testimony of defectors. Strategically positioned traitors perceived.12
included Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Harry
Dexter White and atomic bomb chemist Harry Gold.
White graduated from Harvard with a PhD in
economics and quickly started work in the United States
Department of the Treasury in 1934, becoming the
most influential individual in the department besides the
actual Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau,
Jr. Although not a Communist himself, White was
a “fellow traveler,” an agent who was fully aware of
the destination of the information that he passed on
through spy handler Nathan Gregory Silvermaster.
White was also partially responsible for Operation
Snow, an indirect Soviet mission that resulted in the
United States’ hardline ultimatum against Japan just
before Pearl Harbor. In addition, White exposed US
diplomatic positions before key conferences following
World War II, enabling the Soviets to safely push their
own demands because they knew American priorities
ahead of time. White also wheedled permission from the
Treasury Department to give the Soviets the plates and
information necessary to print the new West German
currency, Allied Marks (AM), in East Germany. When
the Soviets subsequently mass produced the marks in
East Germany while the United States was carefully
trying to regulate the same marks in West Germany, the
entire German economy was completely destabilized.
This destabilization forced the United States to reform
the currency in West Germany to prevent economic
collapse. The irritated Soviets responded to the currency
8 Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 191-192.
9 Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 192-193.

Despite the gravity of these
instances, the Soviet Union acquired
most of its potentially harmful
information legally.

Another common misconception is that the United
States was infested with Russians sent straight from the
Soviet Union to steal the top secret files in Washington,
10 Sulick, Spying in America, 221-226; Haynes, Spies, 258262; Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 119-123; David Rees,
Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward,
McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), 9-13. Schecter and Schecter in
Sacred Secrets, 122, cite an NKVD message from the Russian
Intelligence Archives clearly indicating that the Soviets were
responsible for urging White to obtain these plates and permission
from the United States: “MAY [Stepan Apresian, NKVD rezident
in New York] reported 14 April that LAWYER [code name for
Harry Dexter White] following our instructions passed through
ROBERT [Silvermaster] attained the positive decision of the
Treasury Department to provide the Soviet side with the plates
for engraving German occupation marks, namely the consent was
given to produce for the Red Army two billion occupation marks.
Signed OVAKIMIAN. Note: Immediately inform t. [for tovarich
Comrade] Mikoyan.”
11 J. Edgar Hoover, “The U.S. Businessman Faces the Soviet
Spy,” Harvard Business Review 42, no. 1 (January 1964): 143,
accessed November 8, 2015, from Business Source Complete,
EBSCOhost.
12 Sulick, American Spies, 15.
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D.C. In reality, very few Russians had direct access
to anything of interest to the KGB or its predecessor,
sister, and successor agencies.13 In the opinion of Yuri
Modin, KGB controller of an English spy ring called
the Cambridge Ring, “We [the Soviets] were leery of
sending people out of the Soviet Union for fear of
defections. Most of our officers worked in Moscow, with
the result that the few men posted in foreign countries
had a workload so crushing that many of them cracked
under the pressure.”14 Instead, a few Soviet “handlers”
operated networks of American traitors who were
strategically positioned to acquire valuable information.
For example, Viktor Cherkashin, Soviet head of the
counterintelligence in Washington, D.C., was trained
specifically to recruit US traitors and transmit their
harvests of classified materials back to the Soviet Union.
Cherkashin did not disappoint. He was responsible
for recruiting and collecting information from CIA
officer Aldrich Ames (who betrayed several CIA agents
operating in the Soviet Union to their deaths) and FBI
special agent Robert Hanssen (who sold information to
the Soviets). But Cherkashin himself was not invading
the FBI files or discovering CIA double agents.15

All major espionage crimes were
committed by Americans in positions
of high trust and arguably never
could have been accomplished by
native-born Soviets.
Thus, while Soviets were needed to initially recruit
and subsequently instruct and receive documents from
American agents, all of the major espionage crimes
were committed by Americans in high positions of trust
(Hiss, White, Weisband, and the Rosenbergs, among
many others), and arguably could never have been
accomplished by native-born Soviets. As the Schecters
point out in Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence
Operations Changed American History, “the success of
Soviet intelligence depended on Americans being duped
13 For an overview of the evolution of the various Soviet
intelligence agencies and their heads see the appendices pp. 305315 in Robert Pringle, Historical Dictionary of Russian and
Soviet Intelligence, Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 5 (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press,
Inc., 2006).
14 Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London:
Headline, 1994), 133. Cited in Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword
and the Shield.
15 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 434;
Viktor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, Spy Handler: Memoir of a
KGB Officer, The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert
Hanssen and Aldrich Ames (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

into hurting themselves.”16 And indeed, those Americans
who betrayed the largest secrets actually sought out
KGB agents with whom to share their materials. For
example, Julius Rosenberg, betrayer of important
information on the atomic bomb, was originally an
enthusiastic member of the Young Communist League
and independently offered his services to Jacob Golos, a
leader in the Communist Party of the United States of
America (CPUSA) and an agent handler for the Soviets.
In the representative examples listed above, Soviets per
se did not cause substantial damage to the nation or its
interests abroad.17
Moreover, the use of American traitors was actually
a flaw in the Soviet espionage system that caused
considerable angst for them and joy among their
American counterparts in the FBI and CIA. Motivations
for Americans to turn over information to the Soviets,
whether ideological or monetary, often became
irrelevant or led to the discovery of American traitors.
One of the more common motivations for Americans
to betray their country in the 1920s and 1930s that
was later abandoned was ideological. Members of
the CPUSA and other sympathizers viewed the
Soviet Union as the ideal political system and utopia
on earth and saw themselves as supporters of a great
cause. Such traitors frequently scorned any monetary
remunerations offered and considered Soviet medals of
honor the highest reward possible.18
One such ideologically motivated spy was Harry Gold,
a Jewish-American atomic chemist who became an
information courier for the Soviet project “Enormous”
(the espionage operation that enabled them to accelerate
their construction of the atomic bomb). Gold stated that
he had “never intended any harm to the United States.
For I have always steadfastly considered that first and
finally I am an American citizen.”19 Instead, he said the
Soviets “did a superb job of psychological evaluation
on me . . . on three principal themes. The first was the
matter of anti-Semitism. . . . [T]he only country in the
world where anti-Semitism is a crime against the state
16 Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 187. This page also
summarizes some of the major negative results of espionage by
well-meaning American traitors.
17 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 295, 333. Others who sought
out Soviets were Theodore Hall, Gregory Silvermaster, Charles
Kramer, and Victor Perlo.
18 Haynes, Venona, 333-335; Schecter and Schecter, Sacred
Secrets, 187; Sulick, American Spies, 7-10; Sulick, Spying in
America, 266-267.
19 Harry Gold, Sentencing Statement, July 20, 1950. Legal
Papers of Augustus S. Ballard, Special Collections, Paley Library,
Temple University, cited in Allen Hornblum, The Invisible Harry
Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb, (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 364.
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is the Soviet Union.”20 Whenever he began to doubt
the value of his covert work, Gold reassured himself
with “the idea of helping the people of the Soviet
Union, helping these people live a little better than they
had before.”21 However, after the general economic
poverty and shortcomings of communism began to
show during Stalin’s purges and pact with Hitler, many
Americans became disillusioned with the system and no
longer considered the Soviet Union worth supporting.
As a result, they defected and revealed to the FBI
and CIA whatever they knew about the Soviet system
and the extent of American secrets already betrayed
to the Soviet Union. In Harry Gold’s case, he slowly
realized that the Soviet Union was not the utopia he
had envisioned: “I looked at what was happening in
the countries that the Soviet Union was taking over. I
thought I was helping destroy one monstrosity, and I
had created a worse one, or helped strengthen another
one.”22 When Gold defected, he revealed critical
evidence about the entire Soviet “Enormous” project,
including the activities of such agents as the Rosenbergs.
In short, ideological motivation proved hazardous to
the Soviet Union because it quickly vanished as the
Cold War progressed.23

The Great Depression made
Soviet offers of financial assistance
particularly persuasive and
undermined some Americans' faith in
the West's capitalist system.
The more common incentive, especially later in the
clandestine conflict between the superpowers, was
money. The Department of Defense concluded that
between 1947 and 2001 “Americans most consistently
have cited money as the dominant motive for espionage
and over time money has increased in predominance
among motives. . . . Of individuals who professed a
single motive for espionage, one-fourth of the civilians

and three-fourths of the military claimed they had spied
for money.”24 Even before communism proved unable
to create an earthly utopia, the Great Depression
made Soviet offers of financial assistance particularly
persuasive and undermined some Americans’ faith in
the West’s capitalist system that had allowed such a
global economic disaster. But once again, this motivator
had a built-in exposure mechanism: the American
intelligence agencies could identify individuals who
suddenly and inexplicably became wealthy. This tell-tale
sign most often occurred among military enlisted men,
such as army administrative specialist Clyde Conrad.25
Conrad spent the majority of his espionage career
in the 8th Infantry Division in Germany after World
War II and funneled to the Soviets information about
the United States’ missile sites, oil supply pipelines,
and ammunition dumps. In return, he was given over
one million dollars; these riches eventually proved to
be his downfall. In their search for the source of the
information leak, US counterintelligence was able
to track down Conrad because of the discrepancy
between his meager pay and his suddenly extravagant
lifestyle, complete with expensive art and inexplicable
bank deposits of nearly ten thousand dollars each. As
Sulick observed,
Often the very motives that drive one to spy lead
to their exposure. The person who spies for the
thrill of it takes unnecessary risks and is caught.
. . . And the one who spies for money, in spite of
warnings by his handlers, will spend beyond his
means; and his sudden, unexplained wealth will
raise suspicions and lead to his demise.”26
In all, choosing Americans to do their information
gathering came with built-in and sometimes debilitating
side effects for the Soviets.27

Aside from the Soviets’ faulty channels, it can be argued
that in most cases the material that they managed to
obtain did only limited harm to the United States.
Recent revelations (the Mitrokhin Archive, VENONA,
and various defectors) have established beyond a doubt
that the Rosenbergs, Harry Gold, and others transmitted
20 Hornblum, The Invisible Harry Gold, 305.
enough information to the Soviet Union for them to
21 Hornblum, The Invisible Harry Gold, 306.
22 “Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States,” hearing build their first nuclear weapon. But since they would

before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Committee
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress,
second session, April 26, 1956, p. 1045, cited in Hornblum, The
Invisible Harry Gold, 306.
23 Hornblum, The Invisible Harry Gold, x-xii; Haynes,
Venona, 333-335; Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 187; Sulick, American
Spies, 7-10; Sulick, Spying in America, 266-267. For a detailed
description of another such ideologically motivated and then
disillusioned Soviet agent, see Whittaker Chambers’s book Witness
(New York: Random House, 1952).

24 Katherine Herbig and Martin Wiskoff, Espionage against
the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001 (Monterey, CA:
Defense and Personnel Security Research Center, 2002), quoted in
Sulick, Spying in America, 266.
25 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 333-335; Schecter and
Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 185-187; Sulick, American Spies, 7-10.
26 Sulick, American Spies, 10-11.
27 Sulick, American Spies, 141-148; Haynes and Klehr,
Venona, 333-335; Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 185-187;
Sulick, American Spies, 7-10.
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have developed such weapons independently, given a
few more years, such espionage simply accelerated the
process and reduced the cost. According to Haynes
and Klehr in Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in
America, “Given time and resources, the Soviet Union’s
talented scientists and engineers would certainly
have been able to construct an atomic bomb without
assistance from spies.”28 And although such an argument
is quite tenuous, one could even say that because the
Soviet Union developed nuclear power, the Cold War
never became hot. Both sides feared what was came to
be called MAD (“mutually assured destruction”), which
was a realization that a war between nuclear powers
would be devastating and might not result in a clear
victory for either side.29
Another result of Soviet connivance that actually aided
the United States was Operation Snow, in which Harry
Dexter White drafted an ultimatum against Japan
which ultimately led to Pearl Harbor. This operation,
though it did contribute to US involvement in World
War II, helped to end the Great Depression. Economists
and historians alike agree that World War II finally
ended the Depression by moving a large swathe of the
workforce into the armed forces and by tremendously
increasing the demand for workers to produce supplies
and weapons for the troops. The war certainly killed
millions of people and destroyed much of Europe,
but it did end one of the darkest economic periods in
America’s history. And the United States’ entrance into
the war was helped along by Soviet tool Harry Dexter
White in Operation Snow. Although White’s role was
not decisive, it did at least facilitate such a decision, and
thus initiate the process of economic recovery from the
Great Depression.30
While this case for Soviet espionage benefiting the United
States may be somewhat dubious, such activities almost
definitely set the Soviet Union itself at a disadvantage.
An inherent flaw in the Soviets’ policy of pilfering as
much information as possible from the United States
28 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 333.
29 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 333; Haynes, Klehr, and
Vassiliev, Spies, 143. The independent development of nuclear
capacity by other nations is also proof that the Soviet Union
would have eventually developed such weapons even without the
assistance of US traitors. A detailed treatment of the MAD policy
and variations on it can be found in Corbin Fowler’s “U.S. Nuclear
Warfighting Policy: A Critique,” Public Affairs Quarterly 2, no.
3 (July 1988): 85–95, accessed November 21, 2015, http://www.
jstor.org/stable/40435686.
30 For one treatment of WWII’s role in ending the Great
Depression, see J. R. Vernon’s “World War II Fiscal Policies and
the End of the Great Depression,” The Journal of Economic
History 54, no. 4. (December 1994): 850–68, accessed November
21, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2123613. Schecter, Sacred
Secrets, 22-45.

was that the Soviet Union was necessarily always a step
behind the US. No matter how many nuclear secrets,
B-25 bomber blueprints, and commercial engine designs
they stole, the Soviets could only match their rival’s
weapons, not exceed them. In the opinion of Soviet
rocket scientist Sergo Beria, whose father Lavrenti Beria
had helped produce the first Soviet atomic bomb, “in the
1930s and 1940s, Soviet intelligence was like a vacuum
cleaner, sucking up whatever technology it could lay
its hands on. The take included atomic bomb secrets,
proximity fuses, the design for safety shaving razors, the
process for refining sugar, and the formula for synthetic
rubber.” But despite all of the benefits, “Beria believed
this pattern for developing technology led to the demise
of the Soviet Union. No society can prosper, he said, if
it always has to try to recreate the technology after it has
already succeeded elsewhere.” In a very apt analogy,
Beria continued: “Every street thief runs out of the
money he has stolen; he can never get ahead because he
has not learned how to make money. Thus . . . stealing
technology leaves the thief permanently trailing behind
those he has robbed.”31 One can logically conclude,
then, that not only did the United States not suffer as
greatly as is commonly thought, but the Soviet Union
actually experienced negative consequences from its
own espionage.32

An inherent flaw in the Soviets'
policy of pilfering as much
information as possible . . . was that
the Soviet Union was necessarily
always a step behind the US.
Another ironic result of increased Soviet activities was
the United States’ decision to build and strengthen its
own intelligence agencies. Because the Soviet Union
refused to share enough information during World
War II, the United States decided to break the code
of its “ally’s” messages with the original intention of
coordinating its efforts better. In the words of William
Crowell, Deputy Director of the National Security
Agency (1994-1997), “The Russians were a critical
part of success in the war. At that time they were the
key to victory in Europe. We had no idea from them
how they were doing. They just weren’t telling us.”33 In
1943, Army intelligence suggested decoding the Soviet
messages, that they had been collecting since Stalin had
31 Interview with Sergo Beria by Vyacheslav Luchkov, Kiev,
1996, quoted in Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 298.
32 Hoover, “The U.S. Businessman Faces the Soviet Spy.”
33 Interview with William Crowell, Maryland, September 23,
1997, quoted in Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 93.
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signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler in 1939,
and started amassing intelligence officials to carry
out this job. In this way, the United States uncovered
what has come to be called VENONA, about 2,900
Soviet messages containing a wealth of evidence that
hundreds of Americans in high places were spying for
the Soviets in ways that an ally should not have been.
The small extant intelligence agencies in America were
greatly expanded and invigorated once the United
States realized the threat posed by Soviet and other
espionage: “World War II created a vast expansion in
the nation’s security and counterintelligence apparatus
that included an expanded and powerful FBI, an active
military intelligence division in the War Department,
the Manhattan Project’s vigilant, if not always effective,
security staff, and the officious House of Un-American
Activities Committee.”34 In other words, thanks to
Soviet attempts at infiltration, the United States’
counterintelligence improved markedly.35

Even the CIA and the FBI were infiltrated by Soviet
agents Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, respectively.
But, in many cases, counterintelligence succeeded. They
decoded VENONA and used it to neutralize the effect
of many Soviet breaches into top secret information,
removing various suspects from positions of access and
changing military plans and locations. Even though
American counterintelligence did not release the
VENONA files to the public—thus depriving the courts
of much-needed evidence to prosecute American
traitors—this decision was extremely well thought out.
In the analysis of J. Edgar Hoover, “the defense attorney
would immediately move that the messages be excluded,
based on the hearsay evidence rule [because] neither the
person who sent the message [a Soviet official] nor the
person who received it [a Soviet official] was available
to testify and thus the contents of the message were
purely hearsay as it related to the defendants.” Hoover
went on to explain that even if the VENONA messages
were accepted as evidence, “the fragmentary nature
of the messages themselves, the assumptions made by
the cryptographers in breaking the messages, and the
questionable interpretations and translations involved,
plus the extensive use of cover names for persons and
places, make the problem of positive identification
extremely difficult.” But the strongest argument against
using VENONA as evidence in court was that the
defense would demand access to the messages, and
as FBI Assistant Director Alan Belmont noted in a
Nor, as some would argue,36 was US counterintelligence February 1, 1956, memo,
ineffective. Persistent naiveté did indeed delay
Americans from admitting that there were traitors in
request to have its cryptographers examine those
their midst. According to Sulick,
messages which [the Army Security Agency] has
been unsuccessful in breaking…on the premise
Despite increased security measures and offensive
that such messages, if decoded, could exonerate
counterespionage attempts to penetrate hostile
their clients. This would lead to exposure of
intelligence services, America remained plagued
Government techniques and practices in the
by its chronic tendency toward disbelief that its
cryptography field . . . [and] act to the Bureau’s
citizens in positions of trust would betray the
disadvantage since the additional messages
nation’s secrets. . . . During the Cold War every
would spotlight individuals on whom the Bureau
US government agency involved in national
had pending investigations.38
security, with the exception of the Coast Guard,
fell victim to espionage.37
Summed up briefly, the VENONA messages stood little
chance of standing as convicting evidence in the courts
and, if left unexposed, they were useful in providing
34 Katherine Sibley, “Soviet Military-Industrial Espionage in leads for collecting actual convicting evidence. So the
the United States and the Emergence of an Espionage Paradigm counterintelligence, far from being the incompetents
in US-Soviet Relations, 1941-45,” American Communist History depicted by some historians, very probably made the
2, no. 1, (June 2003): 21, accessed November 8, 2015, from wiser decision in keeping VENONA classified.39

In other ways, too, US counterintelligence proved successful in
retarding or ameliorating Soviet
damage.

Humanities International Complete, EBSCOhost.
35 See Haynes and Klehr’s excellent book Venona for more
information on the decoding of these messages and their contents;
Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 96.
36 One historian that supports this view is Athan Theoharis in
his book Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence
but Promoted the Politics of McCarthysim in the Cold Wars Years
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002).
37 Sulick, Spying in America, 267.

In other ways, too, US counterintelligence proved
successful in retarding or ameliorating Soviet damage,
forcing the Soviets to abandon methods of espionage.
38 FBI Office Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 7,
quoted from Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 142.
39 Sulick, Spying in America, 267-268.
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Although Kim Philby (a British spy recruited by the
Soviets as a double agent with access to US, Canadian,
and Australian counterintelligence) and William
Weisband (a US Army Intelligence cryptanalyst)
eventually told the Soviets about VENONA, allowing
the Soviet Union to change its codes and methods, so
many US traitors had been exposed that the Soviet
Union could no longer actively use these sources.
Almost no one was prosecuted for espionage (FBI agent
Judith Coplon was successfully convicted of transferring
classified information to Moscow but never sentenced,
and the Rosenbergs were some of the only American
traitors to suffer the death penalty for their crimes),
and yet hundreds of agents were neutralized for fear
of providing the FBI hard evidence for prosecution and
confirming the testimony of such defectors as Whittaker
Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, and Harry Gold. Thus,
the KGB ceased using Harry Dexter White after
Elizabeth Bentley defected and betrayed incriminating
information about him.40
Any assessment of Soviet espionage that claims the
conseqences were minimal must begin, as this essay did,
with an admission that the Soviet Union managed to
injure the United States through agents such as John
Walker and Harry Gold. But popular opinion has
exaggerated the extent and nature of the harm beyond
all reasonable proportions. The purpose of this essay has
been to correct these misperceptions by demonstrating
that the damage was done primarily by American agents,
that many of the consequences proved mildly beneficial
to the United States and harmful to the Soviet Union,
and that US counterintelligence successfully combatted
or neutralized the effects of much of Soviet infiltration.

40 Sulick, Spying in America, 211-217; Sulick, Spying in
America, 209. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 261; “Plan
of measures,” March 1949, KGB file 43173, v.2c, pp. 25, 27,
Alexander Vassiliev, Black Notebook [2007 English Translation],
trans. Philip Redko (1993-96), 75, cited in Haynes, Klehr, and
Vassiliev, Spies, 402-403. For a full account of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg’s nuclear espionage for the Soviet Union, see “Chapter
2: Enormous: The KGB Attack on the Anglo-American Atomic
Project,” from Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 33-144.
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